Postwar Iraq's Financial System:  Building from Scratch by Looney, Robert
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2005
Postwar Iraq's Financial System: 
Building from Scratch
Looney, Robert
Middle East Policy, Vol. XII, No. 1, Spring 2005.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40861
134
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
POSTWAR IRAQ’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM: BUILDING
FROM SCRATCH
Robert Looney
Dr. Looney is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.
If I am permitted to dream, Iraq will develop into the Japan of the Middle East.1
                                   – Talib al-Tabatie, chairman, Iraq Stock Exchange
The best thing is to overhaul the whole financial system.  It’s like when you have a house
infested with termites. It’s much easier to knock it down and rebuild than to keep spraying
for termites and fixing the holes.2
                                    – Rubar S. Sandi, head, U.S.-Iraq Business Council
I
n the midst of daily reports of suicide
bombings, insurgents, coalition
casualties and the relentless toll of
civilian dead and wounded, any
appraisal of Iraq’s economy has seemed
irrelevant when set against the greater
military and security concerns.  Yet the
long-run health of the economy will be
crucial in determining whether Iraq will be
able to make the transition to a stable
democracy.
Many authorities on post-conflict
reconstruction feel that the interim
government’s most significant challenge
will be delivering measurable improvements
to the Iraqi people.  The importance of this
goal was summed up by Amatzia Baram,
senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace:
“I think the new government will gain
legitimacy in the eyes of the people on one
condition: if it delivers on security, infra-
structure and employment. . . . If [Iraq’s
leaders] manage to deliver, even on the
latter two, it will make a major difference.
If not, the whole thing will fall apart.”
Significantly, a large proportion of
interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s initial
address focused on the economic issues
confronting Iraq.  Allawi, a Baathist who
served in the Iraqi intelligence services
until falling out with the regime and leaving
Iraq in 1971, cited inflation, unemployment
and weak purchasing power as the main
economic problems. He indicated that the
government planned to stabilize the dinar’s
exchange rate, improve living conditions
and boost oil output.  While he offered no
specific plan for addressing these issues,
he did at least acknowledge that, a year
after the fall of Baghdad, the country’s
economy is at a watershed.
If the security situation does not
improve considerably, efforts to rebuild the
economy will be fruitless.  Yet improve-
ments in the economy are critical for
dampening the insurgency.  In testifying
before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, senior Iraqis have stressed
repeatedly that a key reason Iraqis have
not cooperated with the coalition against
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the insurgency has been resentment over
the lack of progress in improving conditions
and solving unemployment.
The interim government’s economic
strategy to date is a continuation of the
basic approach3 laid down by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA).  Briefly, the
plan encompasses the creation of (a)
openness and transparency of Iraq’s
institutions, (b) strong incentives for
private-sector development, (c) close
economic and financial integration with the
international community, (d) international
standards and best practices, and (e) a
social safety net that addresses the needs
of all Iraqis.4
While many factors within this frame-
work will play a key role in the economy’s
recovery, emphasis on free markets and
private-sector investment suggest that the
creation of a viable, efficient financial
system will be the key to the country’s
economic recovery. In this regard, a recent
UN needs assessment notes:
With a dysfunctional financial system
featuring a poorly organized regula-
tory framework and ineffective
institutions, the task of rebuilding a
sound and safe modern financial
sector in Iraq is daunting.  It should
start with the banking sector which is
currently the essential component of
the financial system and should cover
the sector’s legal and regulatory
aspects as well as its main institutions.
This would be a long-term process
that will require significant resources,
technical as well as financial.5
To gauge the progress made to date in
laying the foundation for the country’s
economic recovery, the sections below
examine the main developments in the Iraqi
financial system since the fall of Saddam
Hussein.  In particular: (a) What was the
condition of the banking system before
March 2003? (b) What are the key institu-
tional structures that have been put in place
over the last year?  (c) Are these institu-
tional structures consistent with the
country’s basic economic structure and
position in the world economy? (d) What
are the key indicators to watch in assessing
progress made at various points in the
future?
ECONOMIC LEGACY OF THE CPA
In the fall of 2003, with Iraq’s
economy still shattered and little recovered
following the ouster of Hussein, the CPA
initiated a package of free-market reforms
reminiscent of the “shock therapy” pro-
grams6  carried out in the early to mid-
1990s in many of the transition economies
of Central and Eastern Europe.7 Overnight
Iraq became the most open economy in the
Arab world.8
While there had been persistent rumors
that major free-market reforms were
contemplated, most observers were
surprised at the extent to which they
embodied key elements of the neoliberal
agenda.  As The Economist noted9 : “If
carried through, the measures will repre-
sent the kind of wish list that foreign
investors and donor agencies dream of for
developing markets.” The main thrust of
the neoliberal reforms centered around five
key provisions:10
1. Investors (except for all-important
oil production and refining) would be
allowed 100-percent ownership of Iraqi
assets, full repatriation of profits and equal
legal standing with local firms.
2. Foreign banks would be welcome to
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establish operations immediately or to
purchase equity shares in existing Iraqi
financial institutions.
3. Income and corporate taxes would
be capped at 15 percent.
4. Tariffs would be reduced to a
universal 5-percent rate, with none im-
posed on food, drugs, books or other
humanitarian imports.
5. Although no precise timetable was
set, Iraq’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
excepting the oil sector, were to be priva-
tized (although the method of privatization
was not specified).
The tax treatment, in particular, is a
classic application of supply-side econom-
ics similar to the programs introduced in
the United States in the early 1980s.11   As
explained by Iraqi Finance Minister Kamel
al-Gailani, low tax rates will help create
strong incentives for future investment and
employment and limit the size of the public
sector, simplify in order to minimize the
administrative costs of tax collection,
create transparency to minimize tax
evasion and corruption, and promote
fairness to ensure that all sectors pay
reasonable shares of future taxes.12
The CPA reforms were also comple-
mented by a series of measures designed
to strengthen institutions critical for the
establishment of a free-market economy.
Most important in this regard were initia-
tives designed to establish a viable banking
sector.  The CPA’s Order Number 40,
issued on September 19, 2003 (and updated
in a slightly modified form13  under Order
No. 94, issued in June 2004), defines the
rules establishing and governing the new
Iraqi banking system and, in so doing,
provides a foundation for Iraq’s future
economic growth and development.
THE BANKING SYSTEM
The banking sector in Iraq dates back
to the mid-1930s, when branches of foreign
banks and private Iraqi banks were
opened. These grew as the economy
expanded. However, in 1964, Iraq consoli-
dated and nationalized private banks into
what is now the Rafidain Bank, the
country’s largest state-owned bank. In the
1980s, the Rafidain Bank and, later, a
second state bank, the Rashid Bank, were
profitable largely through financing the
government’s budget deficits. This prosper-
ity ended when U.N. economic sanctions
were imposed in 1990. From then until the
ouster of Saddam’s regime, most of the
state bank’s business was directed towards
simply underwriting the Iraqi military and
then the ruling party.  The government
opened its banking sector to local private
banks in the early 1990s to spur business
and help offset the impact of sanctions.14
By March 2003, the sanctions, two
wars and several decades of Baathist rule
had left the Iraqi banking sector in com-
plete decay. Greatly compounding the
situation was the devastation inflicted on
the system during the immediate post-war
period.  At that time, the Ministry of
Finance, the Central Bank, the Baghdad
Stock Exchange and the two key state
banks, Rafidain and Rashid, were system-
atically looted, as were a number of the 21
smaller state-owned and private banks.
The situation was so serious that, even a
year later, there was no proper banking
sector to speak of. Iraq was still almost
entirely a cash economy.
In reconstructing the banking system,
the CPA was confronted with a structure
unlike that in many neighboring countries.
In contrast to most banks in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states, recov-
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ering Iraqi banks could not count on
liquidity-driven profits. Very little liquidity
existed.  In addition, Iraqi interest rates
were set high (17 percent) by the Central
Bank. Credit demand was great, and
money-lending (as opposed to other
diversified non-interest revenue) was the
principal source of bank income.  Also, in
contrast to neighboring countries, there
was little demand for Islamic banking.
Other than one small private bank, the Iraqi
Islamic Bank for Development and Invest-
ment, Islamic banking was for all practical
purposes non-existent.
In March 2003, the banking system
had the equivalent of some $2 billion in
assets, of which over 85-90 percent was in
the two state banks. These assets repre-
sented only around 8 percent of Iraq’s
GDP, an extremely low ratio by interna-
tional standards, underscoring the marginal
role played by the banking sector both as a
provider of resources to the economy and
as a store for national savings.15
In an effort to establish a viable
banking sector, the CPA issued Order
Number 40 on September 19, 2003 (and
modified slightly under Order 93 in June
2004).  The provisions of the Banking Law
were modeled significantly after the
Western approach to bank regulation. They
grant the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) full
legal and operational authority. Most
important, the Banking Law provides Iraqi
banks with the powers and authorities
associated with those of modern banks
operating in today’s international financial
system. However, despite the fact that
Islamic banking practices are potentially
just as efficient as those of traditional
banks,16  the Banking Law is silent on their
status.
THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ
As a necessary step in developing a
dynamic commercial banking system, much
of the CPA’s initial focus was on strength-
ening the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI).
Here, the most significant development has
been the issuance of the Law to Govern
the Central Bank of Iraq, which went into
effect March 7, 2004.17
In contrast to the past, the CBI was
made independent of government coercion
and control. Procedures were put in place
to assure higher levels of transparency and
accountability. Most significant, the CBI
will no longer be required to lend to the
various Iraqi ministries and has the author-
ity to undertake monetary policy indepen-
dent of the Finance Ministry. In sum, the
Law to Govern the Central Bank of Iraq
envisages a modern central bank that will
bring greater price stability, foster a
market-based financial system and pro-
mote sustainable growth, employment and
prosperity (Figure 1). In addition, the new
law empowers the CBI to to the following:
1. Take charge of the country’s mon-
etary policy, including exchange-rate policy.
2. Act as a fiscal agent of the govern-
ment, performing financial operations
including the issuing and redeeming of the
Ministry of Finance’s securities.
3. Grant government-owned commer-
cial banks loans on the same terms as
privately owned commercial banks.
4. License and supervise both state-
owned and private commercial banks,
including foreign banks.
Consistent with the new economic
philosophy of the CPA, interest rates have
been liberalized (effective March 1, 2004),
allowing their values to be determined by
market forces.18  As part of the September
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2003 investment law, the CBI also plans to
establish  insurance to provide additional
protection to small and medium-sized
depositors.
Monetary Policy
Perhaps the biggest challenge to
confront the CBI is its ability to effectively
conduct monetary policy.  To do this, the
CBI must be able to regulate either the
interest rate or the quantity of money and
credit in the economy.  Normally, monetary
policy operates through affecting the
underlying demand and supply conditions in
foreign exchange, money or interbank
markets.  In early 2004, these markets
were either non-existent or extremely
underdeveloped19:
1. There was no primary market in
Iraq for government debt. Uncertainty
surrounded the small secondary market in
debt issued by the Hussein government.
That debt may become worthless should a
new government decide not to service it.
2. No functioning markets for debt or
equity securities offered by the private
Iraqi firms existed, although the Baghdad
Stock Exchange was expected to open
once new reporting and accounting stan-
dards were in place.
3. The country had no interbank
market, linking banks via a payment and
settlement system.  The absence of this
market made it nearly impossible for the
CBI to set an effective reference interest
rate or adjust the monetary base.
Figure 1: Central Bank of Iraq
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4. The quantity of base money could
be affected only by altering the amount of
currency in circulation, a very inefficient
process, given uncertainties over the
amount of outstanding currency and the
demand.
As Steve Hanke, economics professor
at The Johns Hopkins University, correctly
notes,20  until these key markets are
developed, CBI will be forced to utilize
direct instruments that work through
involuntary regulations. He sees as likely
candidates controls on banks’ deposit and
lending rates, as well as the use of credit
floors and ceilings. Unfortunately, such
involuntary restrictions are likely to impose
two costs. First, they will make it impos-
sible for banks to allocate their portfolios in
response to market signals. Second, the
restrictions will dampen competition for
deposits.  The net effect will most likely
retard the country’s much-needed financial
development.
Some progress has been made in
developing several of the markets critical
to the financial sector’s success. On June
4, 2004, U.S. administrator Paul Bremer
signed the public-debt law. This new
statute stipulates that the Iraqi government
will be required to honor all of its previous
domestic debts to Iraq’s commercial banks,
debts largely contracted by Saddam
Hussein. This “Saddam Paper” is esti-
mated to be around 1.3 trillion dinars. The
public-debt law can therefore be seen as a
way to bring funds back into Iraq’s banking
sector, much of which would otherwise
face bankruptcy due to insolvency.
The Iraqi Central Bank also holds
about $2.5 billion in Iraqi government debt.
Under the Bond Market Plan put together
by the CPA, that debt must be paid as it
matures. However, because the CPI was
made independent, the government cannot
force the bank to buy its paper, as was
done under Saddam.
Given these domestic debt-servicing
obligations, as well as a cash shortage, the
interim government is attempting to de-
velop a domestic bond market as an
additional source of finance. Iraq’s finance
minister, Adel Abdul-Mahdi, noted, “It’s a
way to recover the economy.  We are
issuing new treasury bills not only to
finance the repayment of treasury bills
outstanding from the former regime, but to
regulate the market and determine interest
rates.”  On July 18, 2004, the Central Bank
of Iraq raised about 150 billion dinars ($103
million) for the government, selling three-
month bonds.
The bonds offered a market-deter-
mined interest rate of 5-8 percent, not
enough to entice foreign banks given the
political risks involved. Instead, the vast
majority of the buyers were local banks,
and the auction was a first step in laying
the groundwork for further borrowing.
Three-month bonds were chosen for their
short maturity, allowing the government to
prove that it is credit-worthy. It plans to
issue six-month and one-year bonds later in
2004 in an effort to raise as much as $1.2
billion by the end of the year.  It is ex-
pected that the development of a govern-
ment debt market will introduce another
constraint on the government. If it over-
spends, as Saddam did, investors will
demand higher interest rates.
In a related initiative, the interim
government began implementing a CPA-
initiated program, the revamping of the old
Baghdad Stock Exchange. The new Iraq
Stock Exchange opened on June 24, 2004,
the product of more than a year’s work on
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a regulatory framework undertaken by the
12 brokerage firms and banks that jointly
own it.  The Iraq Stock Exchange has 27
companies with about 100 to go public
before the fall, and a total of 180 to 200
expected by the end of the year.21  In the
first five sessions, trading volume nearly
quadrupled, and the value of some stocks
surged more than 600 percent.22   Since
then, the exchange index has been some-
what eratic, with many of the country’s
commercial banks selling shares for one
dinar each, “offering this bargain as a lure
for investors who are counting on the
banks to stop issuing new shares as a
prelude to raising share prices.”23
The old stock exchange comprised
only Iraqi companies and traders, while the
new bourse will eventually be accessible to
foreigners. The key to the exchange’s
success is a strong regulatory framework,
transparency and accountability. A shift to
an electronic trading system will be intro-
duced in the near future. Hopefully the
stock market will begin to lure money back
from Iraqi citizens living overseas.24  On
the other hand, many investors complain
that the government has restrained the
market by putting off a decision on
whether to permit foreigners to buy and
sell shares.25
Exchange-Rate Policy
A foreign-exchange market has also
been created with the introduction of the
Iraqi dinar. As with the money markets, the
Central Bank was given independence in
its conduct of exchange-rate policy. While
many experts recommended a fixed
exchange-rate regime whose stability might
be more attractive to foreign investors, the
CBI has opted for a “managed” floating
regime.
Before the development of an active
bond market, the CBI was forced to
control the money supply (and indirectly
the exchange rate) through its buying and
selling of dollars.  This resulted in a fairly
volatile dinar/dollar rate. In fact, at one
point in late 2003, the currency rallied from
2,000 dinars to the dollar to 1,400 following
the phasing out of the old Saddam notes.26
However, the volatility of the exchange
rate does not necessarily bode well and
may indicate that speculative forces rather
than market-based efficiency consider-
ations were driving the rate.  Speculation
may explain the paradox of a strengthening
dinar in December 2003 while prices for
basic goods in Iraqi markets remained the
same or rose even further.27
In practice, exchange rates in the
street markets have provided guidance to
the CBI, which provides dollars to the
commercial banks in a daily auction.
Under the managed floating arrangement,
the CBI is free to buy dollars if it deems
the dinar too dear or if the banks wish to
sell dollars, or sell if there is bank demand
to buy dollars or if the dinar depreciates.
By mid-2004, the CBI had intervened in
this manner on several occasions to curtail
sharp speculator-driven appreciation.
With the introduction of a minimal tariff
structure, the economy is facing world
price levels for the first time since UN
sanctions were imposed after the Gulf War,
forcing painful adjustments in employment
and/or wages and prices. This shock is
likely to be replicated by the recovery of oil
production and the expenditure of donor
funds. Both will produce upward pressure
on the currency, raising the likelihood that
many non-oil sectors will be priced out of
international markets – the so-called
“Dutch disease.”
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The main advantage of the dinar’s
managed float is that adjustments to
changes in the terms of trade (the oil price)
can be made in the exchange rate, rather
than in wages and prices.  Yet this does not
solve the Dutch disease problem. Facing a
similar situation, several other natural-
resource exporters have established
stabilization funds. These keep some part
of the oil revenues in a centrally managed
fund held in foreign currency assets,
thereby reducing inflows into the local
currency and thus appreciation. The fund
should accumulate in good times and
deplete in bad times, thus providing a stable
balance-of-payments environment.28
Direct payment of oil receipts to Iraqi
citizens would also have the advantage of
creating broad-based purchasing power
and thus encouraging the development of
small and medium-sized domestic firms
(SMEs) catering to the domestic market.
SMEs have traditionally been the biggest
source of job creation in the transition
economies of Eastern Europe.
An alternative to the flexible ex-
change-rate policy29 might have been the
adoption, at least initially, of a fixed ex-
change rate managed through a currency
board. Postwar Bosnia and Montenegro
both have stable currencies today, thanks
to currency boards linked to the euro.30
Iraq could have established one with the
dinar linked to the dollar, the euro or an
index based on both. This would have
required considerable hard-currency
reserves, perhaps unrealistic amounts
under the circumstances.
Another factor favoring flexible rates
in Iraq centers on problems likely to
develop if the country pegged to the dollar
or euro the currencies of net oil importers.
For example, maintaining a fixed peg to the
dollar would require Iraq to tie its monetary
policy to that of the United States.  The
likely result would be interest-rate move-
ments counter to the country’s best inter-
ests.  During periods of oil-price increases,
the United States would likely pursue an
expansionary monetary/low-interest-rate
policy to maintain domestic demand.  In
this environment, just the opposite, a tight
monetary/high-interest-rate policy, would
be best for dampening inflationary pres-
sures in an Iraq awash with dollars.
In short, there are distinct advantages
to Iraq in adopting a fixed exchange rate,
at least until monetary institutions and
associated markets are developed and
efficient. Ultimately the choice of the
degree of flexibility of the exchange-rate
regime depends on the objective function
of the authorities as regards the trade-off
between the desire to dampen exchange-
rate volatility, and control inflation by using
the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, and
to reduce fluctuations in output by allowing
the nominal exchange rate to absorb
shocks.
As it stands, however, the decision to
proceed with a flexible exchange rate
means that monetary policy must allocate
the task of domestic stabilization, with
fiscal policy focused on balance-of-
payments stability.  In essence, the govern-
ment must rely on its weakest economic
tool – monetary policy – to tackle the
country’s massive unemployment problem.
In this environment, we are likely to see
fairly wide fluctuations in exchange and
interest rates; hopefully these rate move-
ments will not significantly discourage
much-needed private investment and
foreign-capital inflows.
Despite these concerns, the exchange
rate has been relatively stable. Demand for
142
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 1, SPRING 2005
the Iraqi dinar has been so strong that the
Iraqi government earned approximately $5
billion in seignorage between October 2003
and October 2004.31  Part of this stability
amid the chaos stems from the steadfast
willingness of the CBI to convert dinars
into dollars. Under these circumstances,
there is unlikely to be much impact on the
currency from the lack of stability in the
country.32
In sum, if the framework established
by the CPA is maintained, Iraq will develop
a highly open economy. Just as important, it
will have many of the modern financial
institutions governed by international
standards needed to operate in this envi-
ronment.  Economic theory suggests that
this system is best served by the combina-
tion of a managed floating exchange-rate
regime and an oil-stabilization fund.  How-
ever, as with many aspects of the CPA
program, one is in place while the other is
not.  Property rights, a key element in most
free-market reforms, is another neglected
area. Perhaps the intent of the CPA was to
simply defer many of the specific legalities
to an elected Iraqi government.
MAIN AREAS OF CONCERN
Clearly the CBI faces a number of
obstacles. Its ability to meet these chal-
lenges will go a long way in setting the tone
for the country’s financial-market develop-
ment and, ultimately, the success of
reconstruction efforts. In this regard, the
above considerations suggest that, with
regard to the CBI, the main issues to
monitor include:
1. Inflation rate: Does the CBI have
the tools and expertise to control the
money supply? Bank deposits in foreign
currencies increased by 26 percent in
March 2004 compared with a year before;
deposits in Iraqi dinars increased by 63
percent over the same period.
2. Fluctuations in the exchange rate:
Will they be destabilizing or disruptive?
3. Sudden Capital Inflows: With its
existing tools, can the CBI prevent specu-
lative bubbles? Many of the transition
economies of Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union have experienced
destabilizing surges of financial inflows and
outflows.33  As Iraq opens its economy, will
it suffer the same fate?
4. Exchange Rate Overvaluation: If
the exchange rate becomes overvalued,
will the CBI be able correct the situation to
modify the impact on private investment?
Export-oriented industries may decline
because of intense foreign competition for
many producers for the local market (the
Dutch disease).
5. Regulation/Supervision: Will the
CBI quickly develop the expertise to
effectively regulate and supervise a rapidly
expanding and diverse banking system?
6. Crisis Management: Will the bank
be able to quickly put into place emergency
measures for meeting the challenge to the
system posed by bank failures?
7. Capital Market Development: Will
the bank be able to work with the Ministry
of Finance to develop and create an
efficient bond market?
While it’s too early to form firm
judgments about the CPA program’s
influence on Iraq’s fiscal and monetary
aspects, a safe guess is that, while con-
straining, it does not place any impediments
on the Iraqis other than what are normally
found in any sound financial system. The
CPA-based rules and institutions simply
represent the steps responsible govern-
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ments must take to lay the foundation for
sustainable growth. Or, in the words of
Adel Abdul-Mahdi, Iraqi finance minister,
“We inherited a corrupted and bad
economy. It was a mafia economy rather
than a market economy. We are trying to
rebuild the new Iraq on a solid basis.”34
The State Banks
While Iraq’s two state-owned banks,
Rasheed and Rafidain, control over 85
percent of banking assets (top, Figure 2),
they are at best marginally capitalized and
have loan portfolios with a high concentra-
tion of non-performing loans.  Before
March 2003, the banks clearly lacked
modern comprehensive accounting stan-
dards and systems. Despite the fact that
they had a large network of more than 360
branches, each branch operated largely as
an independent unit with no real centralized
management or integrated system for
making and clearing payments.35
Developments prior to March 2003 left
the state banks with a unique set of
features.  In contrast to their counterparts
in other developing countries, Rafidain and
Rasheed did not lend extensively to the
corporate sector, either state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) or private ones.
Instead, state enterprises received most of
their funding through government grants
and hidden subsidies.  The Iraqi govern-
ment, in turn, would finance itself by
issuing debt in the form of treasury bills
subscribed by the banking sector – mostly
Rafidain and Rasheed.  As a result,
treasury bills account for about two-thirds
of Rafidain’s assets and 50 percent of
Rasheed’s portfolio.36
At the same time, the SOEs had to
place their deposits with Rafidain and
Rasheed.  In fact, these funds represent
about half of Rafidain’s total deposits.
Ironically, given the limited amount of
financing extended by banks to the SOEs,
the state enterprises may, in effect, be net
creditors to Rafidain and Rasheed.37
Several factors are severely restraining
the activities of the state banks.  In particu-
lar, the debt overhang and the attachment
risk on assets by creditors are making it
impossible for the public-sector  banks to
perform international banking functions.38
The U.S. Treasury has worked with
the state banks in an attempt to enable
them to provide better domestic services
such as taking deposits, clearing checks
and making loans to support business
activity. There are some signs of success.
For the quarter ending November 30, 2003,
Rafidain and Rasheed extended loans
totaling about $6 million, primarily to small
and medium-sized enterprises.39  This
portfolio shift represents a sharp break
from past practices.
Clearly, substantial and sustained
restructuring of management, organization,
personnel and systems is needed to make
the state banks competitive, profitable and
able to provide a wide array of high-quality
financial services.  Rafidain, for example,
plans to lay off a third of its 7,300 employ-
ees and restructure its debt-burden balance
sheet in preparation for privatization.  The
bank is saddled with over $20 billion of
Iraq’s debt.  The former Iraqi government
opened letters of credit through the bank
that were never settled, with the debt
becoming technically classified as the
bank’s liability.
Privatization will probably entail
entering into a partnership with foreign
banks rather than an outright sale of assets
to those institutions.  The uncertainty over
the future status of the bank is no doubt
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taking a heavy toll on employee morale and
limiting bank functioning in the short-run.40
Private Banks
As noted above, the government
opened its banking sector to local private
banks (middle, Figure 2) in the early 1990s.
By the year 2000, these banks had a
market share of around 6.6 percent. Also,
at that time, private-sector banks had a
loan market share of 21 percent, a very
high rate in light of their position in the
deposit market. The credit-deposit ratio for
the private banks was around 52 percent,
suggesting that, for the most part, private
banks were quite profitable.41
Still, the overall performance of these
banks must be classed as unsatisfactory by
almost any standard.  In addition to their
small share of the deposit market, private
banks used antiquated technology and
could provide only very limited services to
their customers.  Because most Iraqis did
not trust the government, they preferred to
hold their deposits in banks outside the
country, mainly in Jordan and Lebanon.
In short, private banks are still suffer-
ing from a wide range of problems, includ-
ing the uncertain security situation in Iraq,
the chance of instability of the Iraqi dinar,
and the lack of adequate capital markets.
The situation is made worse by the fact
that local banks have limited capital bases,
limited customer reach, outdated technolo-
gies and inadequately trained staff.42
Banking Law (September 2003-June
2004)
The CPA banking law addressed many
of these problems.
1. Domestic banks are required to
increase their capital to 10 billion Iraqi
dinars within 18 months. This is expected
to encourage consolidation and foreign
investment.
2. Banks must maintain long-term
capitalization consistent with international
standards.
3. More rigorous qualifications are set
for bank licensing and for bank managers
and boards of directors.
4. Foreign banks may enter the mar-
ket. The legislation allows for six foreign
banks to enter the market over the next
five-years.  The Central Bank of Iraq, with
assistance from the CPA, will develop
procedures for foreign bank licensing and
for establishing representative offices.
Central bank regulations and supervi-
sory capabilities are being developed to
support the new banking legislation.
Foreign Banks
While no doubt some of the existing
private banks will evolve into fully function-
ing financial institutions, one of the most
important aspects of the Banking Law is
the opening up of the Iraqi market to
foreign banks.  These banks are expected
to play an important role in increasing the
availability of credit, providing a network of
relationships to Iraq that will support
economic growth, and accelerating the
process of strengthening the banking sector
through competition and the transfer of
technology, know-how and best practices.
Eastern European transition-economy
experiences with financial-sector reforms
show that one of the most important
contributors to modernizing financial
sectors is bringing in foreign banks.43
In January 2004, Britain’s HSBC and
Standard Chartered and the National Bank
of Kuwait (NBK) were granted licenses
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and are expected to start up operations by
the end of the year. They were selected
from 15 applicants, including banks from
across the Middle East. The conditions for
selection focused on expertise outside a
bank’s home country and a commitment to
invest in Iraq. The three banks have each
pledged to keep a minimum of $25 million
in Iraq. Standard Chartered has been
expanding in the Middle East, opening
branches in Jordan and Lebanon in recent
years and focusing on retail. HSBC, the
world’s second-largest bank by market
value, already operates in 12 Middle East
countries. The National Bank of Kuwait is
one of the largest Gulf banks. Kuwait
hopes to be a base for firms eyeing Iraqi
reconstruction but worried over security.
As for the future, no doubt there will
be a series of mergers, with foreign banks
Figure 2: Iraq – Banking System Issues
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looking at investing in the sector and
financing projects (bottom, Figure 2). The
recent purchase of the Iraqi Credit Bank
(the first purchase of an Iraqi credit bank
in four decades) by the Kuwait National
Bank, if successful, may usher in a series
of similar acquisitions.44  Some of the
private banks may survive by developing
special niches.  Many have done well in
the year following April 2003. Many made
good loans secured by real estate.45   They
have also been relatively successful in
selling shares on the new Iraq Stock
Exchange.46
In spite of their small size, the private
banks currently have several advantages
over the two large state banks. In particu-
lar, they are less encumbered in establish-
ing correspondent relationships with foreign
banks. They are not subject to having their
foreign assets seized in any future Iraqi
government debt-resolution scheme. The
state banks will face that risk until there is
a comprehensive official rescheduling and
write-down of Iraq’s international debts,47
although this advantage has been some-
what lost with the November 2004 Paris
Club agreement to forgive approximately
80 percent of Iraq’s outstanding external
debts.48
Part of the problem faced by Iraq’s
banks in the immediate post-war period
stemmed from their limited services (in
part brought on by the security situation).
Services were limited to deposit taking,
cash withdrawals and manual check
clearing.  The economy was essentially
cash-based.  Although very slow to come,
one development that is very encouraging
for the long-run profitability of private
banks is the implementation of a new inter-
bank and intra-bank payment system
controlled by the CBI.49
This system allows for money transfer
using a mechanism dubbed “original credit”
(OC), which is transacted through Visa’s
global processing network – VisaNet. By
late 2004, the VisaNet system linked 20
state and privately owned commercial
banks. To sidestep problems with poor
terrestrial communications networks, each
of the banks’ branches are able to access
the network via a laptop-sized satellite
communications receiver and satellite dish.
The satellite communications box links to
VisaNet for payment processing, acting as
a host terminal for each bank.
The Trade Bank of Iraq
While some of the private banks are
beginning to supply trade financing, given
their limited capacity to perform this
function, the Governing Council and the
CPA decided to establish a bank to facili-
tate the imports and exports urgently
needed to support Iraq’s reconstruction and
the transition from the U.N. Oil-for-food
program. To this end, the CPA awarded a
consortium led by the U.S.-based J. P.
Morgan Chase & Co. the tender for
operating the Trade Bank of Iraq. The
consortium consists of 13 banks represent-
ing 14 countries. The Trade Bank of Iraq is
planned to operate for 12 months but may
continue for another two or three years,
especially if the private banks and restruc-
tured state banks are still not in a position
to effectively assume this business.
TEN SIGNS OF PROGRESS AND
CONCERN
In judging progress in the banking area,
several key developments will be of
particular importance:
1. Extent to which funds are being repatri-
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ated into the banking system,
2. Speed and extent of recapitalization of
the private banks,
3. Progress at restructuring the state
banks,
4. Extent to which foreign banks are
investing in joint ventures with private
banks,
5. Response of savers and borrowers to
interest-rate changes,
6. Extent to which the state banks can
expand loans for private-sector investment,
7. Speed and extent of diversification of
bank assets away from real estate,
8. Extent to which private-bank credit fuels
the consumption boom rather than private
investment,
9. Extent to which banks can develop
expertise to evaluate private-investment
projects, and
10.  Progress made in developing an
efficient bond market.
Developments that may signal trouble
ahead:
1. Growing reliance by borrowers on
microfinance administered by NGOs,
2. Limited number (well below 15) of
foreign banks applying for the next round
of licenses to operate in Iraq,
3. Increased pressure on the CBI from
religious groups opposed to Western-style
banking,
4. Little or no investment in Iraq originating
from foreign financial institutions/funds,
5. Erratic fluctuations in interest rates or
the exchange rate,
6. Speculative bubbles fueled by rapid
short-term capital inflows and outflows,
7. Ongoing inflation and the inability to
develop a viable government bond market,
8. Ongoing bank failures, and
9. Extended reliance on the Trade Bank of
Iraq.
ASSESSMENT
The relevant CPA Orders laid a solid
foundation for the creation of an efficient
modern banking system.  While one may
quibble over such things as the desirability
of fixed over flexible exchange rates and
the ability of the CBI to conduct precise
monetary policy, it is hard to envision a
more comprehensive set of institutional
changes to the country’s financial system.
However, the CPA’s efforts may be a
necessary but insufficient condition for
success. It is quite likely that development
of the banking sector, together with its
contribution to investment and economic
growth, will be largely conditioned by
developments in other areas: in particular,
(1) the security situation, (2) progress
made in resolving the country’s outstanding
foreign debt and (3) developments in the oil
sector.  The recent Paris Club reduction of
80 percent of Iraq’s outstanding foreign
debt has been a welcome development,
largely eliminating the second concern.
However, adverse developments in either
of the two remaining areas could seriously
impede the development of a viable,
functional banking system in Iraq.
One also senses that the system laid
down by the CPA, while technically
correct and efficient by Western standards,
was created in something of a vacuum.
There does not appear to be much give and
take between the CPA and Iraqi represen-
tatives in arriving at a consensus likely to
be acceptable to large segments of the
local population.  Islamic banking, one of
the most rapidly growing areas of finance
in the Middle East, is not even mentioned in
the voluminous documents and directives
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released by the CPA.  As a result, there is
great uncertainty over the direction the
system will take once an elected Iraqi
government is in power.  No doubt this
uncertainty, in addition to the security
situation, is undermining the growth and
development of this critical sector. As late
as March 2004, a prominent Lebanese
official noted,
The country is full of opportunities,
but the investment horizon is not clear
yet. I don’t think Lebanese banks will
move to Iraq . . . . We don’t really
know what the laws are yet. 50
In sum, what was created in Iraq is a
banking system rather unique to the Middle
East and one that eventually may not be
accepted by the Iraqis.
What any foreigners write or say is
irrelevant unless the people of Iraq are
involved. Most important, we cannot
go into Iraq and build a set of institu-
tions that reflect American and
Western European values. This will
not work. The new Central Bank of
Iraq will belong to the Iraqis and so
they have to set it up. . . . We can set
out a framework of principles that
appear to be universal, but the details
are up to the people who live there,
not us.51
In this sense, the Iraqi banking system
may be a microcosm reflecting a larger set
of issues and problems now facing the new
interim government.
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